美國存款利率抑制 USDC 採用，國際結算銀行模型揭示原因

一項由國際結算銀行於 10 月 13 日發布的研究將銀行存款重新定價與 USDC 增長的預估放緩聯繫起來，這一增長幅度大於 USDT，因此銀行的報價可以對每個發行者的穩定幣採用產生不同的影響。

較高的存款利率使持有者有更強的財務理由將餘額保留在銀行。研究中，存款利率每增加一個基點，USDC 在十周內的累計增長約減少 4.8%，而 USDT 的增長則減少 1.9%。

研究人員 Rashad Ahmed 和 Iñaki Aldasoro 使用了從 2019 年 1 月到 2025 年 6 月的每週數據。國際結算銀行在 3 月 24 日發布的第一版之後，於 10 月發布了該研究的最新版本，早期的摘要已經報告了 USDC 更強的反應。

交易所可以向符合條件的客戶提供可變獎勵，為餘額競爭增加了另一個價格。這使得歷史發行者的分裂對於採用預測變得有用，同時也留下了當前銀行與平台之間的比較待建立。

發行者估算的比較

該論文的存款利率測量平均了六個國家的儲蓄和貨幣市場存款賬戶系列。這與美國聯邦儲備的政策利率以及任何特定高利率賬戶的利率是不同的。

十周的 OLS 點估算將兩個發行者分開：

普通最小二乘法 (OLS) 是基準統計模型，而負估算描述了相對於模型比較路徑的增長放緩。

作者將 USDC 的較大反應解釋為其與美國機構和去中心化金融用戶的更緊密聯繫。這些持有者可能更有理由將銀行存款與穩定幣餘額進行比較，並且他們將 USDT 的較弱反應與其離岸和發展中國家的用途聯繫起來。

數據無法識別哪些個別持有者轉換或涉及哪些銀行賬戶，因此發行者的解釋是對模式的詮釋。

對於採用預測，這意味著應用於所有穩定幣的存款利率假設可能會掩蓋不同的競爭壓力。點估算表明，在這個樣本中，USDC 與美國存款定價的關係更強，而未確定任何代幣在每個市場環境中的固定反應。

對於穩定幣的總體，基準的十周估算是每增加一個基點存款重新定價約減少 2.8% 的累計增長。第二個模型使用了旨在隔離存款重新定價的工具變量方法，產生了約 9.1% 減少增長的更大估算。

該方法利用了當聯邦基金目標中點在四周前至少為 3.125% 時，銀行對政策利率變化的更強傳遞。它依賴於隨後的變化通過存款重新定價影響穩定幣需求。

這些控制涵蓋了政策和國債利率、比特幣價格、美元指數和市場波動性，幫助區分存款價格競爭與更廣泛的投資條件，而不證明識別假設。

作者指出工具的弱點：第一階段的 F 統計量為 9.78，低於他們引用的 10 的常規閾值。由於樣本中只有一次高利率事件，較大的估算對於其在不同利率周期中的應用支持證據有限。

在論文的工具變量圖表中，USDC 的十周 95% 置信區間仍然低於零，而 USDT 的置信區間包括零。

A separate deposit-tier comparison also supports the direction of the relationship, using differences in how banks reprice preferred money-market and savings accounts.

Checks for the Silicon Valley Bank episode, crypto events, trading volume, and DeFi yields retain negative relationships. Responses among balances supplied to lending protocols remain imprecise. The evidence supports competition, but its magnitude depends on the model and sample.

獎勵改變持有者的比較

The return on a stablecoin balance is also shaped by the platform on which it sits. In research published June 19, the BIS distinguished two economic models for exchange payments to stablecoin holders.

Under reserve-based remuneration, an exchange transmits part of the income generated by the issuer's reserve assets to holders. Under activity-based remuneration, payments are tied to lending, trading, and other market activity.

The bulletin uses Coinbase and Binance as respective examples, while acknowledging that the boundaries are imperfect.

In its historical exchange-yield evidence, Coinbase's USDC holding yield followed policy and reserve yields more closely, while Binance's yields were more exposed to crypto activity. These are different ways to fund returns on balances, with different reasons those returns change.

Coinbase's current rewards terms describe USDC Rewards as a loyalty program funded by the exchange without using or lending a customer's USDC without instruction.

Coinbase also requires customers to be in an eligible region, be eligible to trade, and hold at least $1 of USDC. Its FAQ also requires Coinbase One membership in several regions, including the US and UK.

Rates vary by country, account type, and ongoing experimentation, and Coinbase can change them or discontinue the program. The public FAQ directs users to account-specific rates and does not establish one current annual percentage yield (APY) available to every USDC holder.

These conditions complicate a bank-account comparison. The relevant return depends on the actual customer and offer, alongside any membership costs and differences in risk. Coinbase says USDC balances in its accounts are not deposit accounts and lack FDIC or SIPC insurance.

Exchange rewards already existed during part of the study's sample, and the working paper acknowledges third-party yields and includes a DeFi-yield control in its robustness analysis.

That control does not estimate today's Coinbase membership requirements or every exchange's account-specific reward spread. Native issuer interest, exchange-funded rewards and yields from lending tokens remain distinct mechanisms.

穩定幣回報可以通過銀行存款、儲備收入、交易所獎勵或DeFi貸款到達持有者。

需求競爭使貸款問題懸而未決

The working paper's authors explain that stablecoin funds are ultimately reinvested, potentially redistributing deposits across institutions and depositor types depending on the issuer's counterparties.

Reserve routing and depositor composition could affect bank funding costs. The current demand estimates address a different part of that chain: how stablecoin balances respond to what banks offer depositors.

A larger response for USDC cannot be converted directly into a figure for lost bank lending. That would also require evidence on where reserves go, how banks replace funding and how they adjust credit provision.

The study estimates responses to changes in deposit rates, but its coefficients cannot be applied directly to a Federal Reserve rate move, because bank repricing and the return available on each platform are separate inputs.

一個有用的預測應該區分發行者、持有者的地點和偏好、銀行的重新定價以及獲取交易獎勵的途徑。更新的證據將發行者的增長與可比用戶實際的銀行與平台回報相連接，將有助於確定歷史關係在下一階段採用中延伸的程度。

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